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Reservations to Multilateral Treaties:
How International Legal Doctrine
Reflects World Vision
JEAN KYONGUN KOH
When a state makes a reservation to an eXISting or proposed
multilateral treaty, l it takes exception to one or more provisions of that
treaty.2 A valid3 reservation alters the state's rights and obligations under
the treaty with respect to the objectionable portion. Although reserva-
tions appear to be merely a legal technicality" a last-minute accom-
modation after complicated multilateral negotiations, the doctrine of
reservations in fact strikes at the heart of the concept of a multilateral
convention. The doctrine pits an individrtal state's desire to depart
from the terms of the treaty against the general agreement of all par-
ties to be bound equally by the terms of a common document.
By examining the evolution of the doctrine of reservations in this
century, this Comment will explore how the successive versions of the
doctrine reflect the changing conception of multilateral conventions,
and will illustrate how a tiny nugget of treaty law provides a bat-
tleground for the clash between two basic opposing visions of the
world: a world composed of autonomous states versus an integrated
world order.4 This analysis5 will show how each version of the doctrine of
1. For purposes of this Comment, the terms "multilateral treaties" and "multilateral conventions"
are used interchangeably.
2. Presumably. any exception to a treaty termed a reservation by the reserving State would be
automatically considered a reservation. Srates hoping to avoid wrestling with the doctrine of reserva-
tions altogether often term their reservations "mere clarifications," "interpretive declarations," and
the like. R~porl of the International law CommiIion on the Work ofits Eighteenth Swion. (1966)
II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 172, 190; Bowett, Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties.
(1976·1977) BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 67. 68. For purposes of this Comment, any statement fitting the
definition of reservations, broadly conceived. shall be considered a reservation.
3. For purposes of this Comment. a reservation is valid if it does not disqualify the reserving State
from becoming a party to the treaty. As shall be explained below. both the concept of "validity"
and that of "party" will vary from system to system.
4. For purposes of this Comment. visions of the world are general pictures of international life.
C/. R. Parker. Political Vision in Constitutional Argument (Feb. 1979) (unpublished manuscript on
file in Harvard Law School Library), at 78.
5. The methodology developed in this Comment owes a great intellectual debt to Monon). Hor-
witz, Richard D. Parker. Lewis D. Sargentich, Louis B. Sohn, and Henty J. Steiner who have ex·
plored these ideas with the author in several conversations during the course of the writing of this
Comment.
In addition, the methodology has been influenced by the writren work of Professors Horwitz,
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reservations represents a new balance struck between two competing
conceptions of multilateral conventions, each of which is based on a
particular vision of world society and the international legal order.
Part I describes the methodology of this analysis and outlines the
nature of pure "subjective" and "purposive" views of the validity of
reservations; it then describes how each of these views suggests par-
ticular visions of multilateral treaties and of international relations.
Part II analyzes each of the five versions of the doctrine of reservations
which have prevailed during this century and in each case derives the
conflicting conceptions of multilateral treaties that each new version
of the doctrine reveals. Finally. Part III, with the help of the graphical
analysis presented in the Appendix, summarizes the conclusions of
Part II and speculates on the implications of this analysis beyond tlle
realm of the law of reservations.
1. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL CONCEPTS
A. First Pnnciples
Legal doctrine6 is both a legal and political creature.7 Each legal doctrine
contains a purely legal component and a purely political component
and, to be properly understood, must be analyzed in terms of each.
The purely legal component of legal doctrine consists of the process
of systematic, rational and abstract reasoning and visions of social
ordering.s The purely political component consists of the struggle for
power and visions of social relations.9 Although these ideal components
Parker. and Duncan Kennedy in British and American legal history and jurisprudence. See generally
M. HORWJ1Z. THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780·1860 (1977); Kennedy. The Slmc·
lure ofBlackstone's Commenlaries. 28 BUFFALO 1. REv. 209 (1980) [heteinafter cited as Kennedy,
Blackstone]; Kennedy, Legal Formality. 2J. LEGAL Swo. 351 (1973); Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HlIRv. 1. REv. 1685 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy, Form
and Subst4nce); Parkr.r. supra note 4.
6. For purposes of this Comment. legal doctrine consists of the rules and principles governing
or proposed to govern any particular area of the law. In more colloquial rerms, legal doctrine Is
black letter law. The Restatements and the Model Codes are examples of legal doctrine.
7. This Comment seeks to explore more precisely the widely recognized influence of politics in
the creation and evolution of legal doctrine. See generally Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra nOle
5. passim; see also Kennedy, Blackstone, supra note 5. at 209·21.
8. A "purely legal vision" is a general picture of the institutional structure of order in a society.
For example, the purely legal vision of the state of nature depicts no institutions and no norms
structuring the society and thus no order. The purely legal vision of a vlorld governed by one parlia·
ment passing legislation binding all world citizens depicts a world legal system integrated by
sophisticated institutions and universal norms. Between these two theoretical and extreme purely
legal visions of the world, one can imagine other legal visions. For instance, a third vision might
reveal a world order sought through contracts among autonomous states in accordance with universal
contract principles.
9. A "purely political vision" of social relations is a general picture of the nature of the relation·
ship between individuals in a sociery. For example. the purely political vision of the state of nature
depicts relationships of hostiliry and alienation among individuals. At the other extreme, the purely
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do not exist in the real world, they are useful analytic tools for
understanding the two distinct sets of demands placed upon legal doc-
trine as it seeks to function in society.10
Because it responds to the demands of pure politics and pure law,
legal doctrine, although often consisting of highly specific, substantive-
ly limited norms, nevertheless reveals broad political and legal visions
of the world. Doctrines of international law contain purely political
components suggesting visions of the world which can be viewed on
a spectrum between two poles: absolute state autonomy on the one
hand and one world community on the other. The purely legal com-
ponents similarly reflect visions of world ordering which can be viewed
on a spectrum between two poles: absolute state autonomy on the one
hand and one integrated world legal order on the other. l1
The doctrine of reservations to multilateral treaties, as seen in its
five twentieth century versions, illustrates the way in which legal doc-
trine incorporates both purely legal and political elements
simultaneously. In so doing, the doctrine takes on a life of its own
which in turn affects the legal and political world in which it evolved.. .
B. Subjectivity and Purposiveness
To determine which legal visions of multilateral treaties and of the
world legal order, and which political visions of multilateral treaties
and of international relations correllate with each of the five historical
positions on reservations, it is necessary to distinguish the subjective
and purposive elements of each position.
A purely subjective determination of the validity of a reservation has
as its sole criterion the consent of all the parries to the treaty. 12
political vision of a world community depicts relationships of interdependence and trust among in-
dividuals. Between these two theoretical and exueme purely political visions of the world, one can
imagine other political visions. For instance, a third vision might describe a society in which relation-
ships within a cemin group (e.g., a family, a state or an international organization) are characterized
by amicable relations while relations between members of different groups are hostile.
10. These purely legal and purely political components must coexist in any given legal doctrine
if it is to b: considered legitimate. Parker, supra note 4, at 32 (defining "legitimacy" as the quality
inspiting voluntary acceptance). For a legal doctrine to be accepted as legitimate by those it is meant
to bind. it must be detached from the world enough to be objective and unprejudiced, and yet
must also be sufficiently sensitive to and ctitical of the world to respond to concrete demands. Id.
at 62·76. In other words, the purely legal components of the doctrine would lend it the required
detachment while' the purely political components of the doctrine would lend it the required sen-
sitivity and criticism to make the doctrine relevant to rile "World. •
11. The Appendix illustrates that in fact rile political and legal spectra are not parallel but can
be visualized instead as axes on a graph. See infra Appendix 108·16.
12. Sit Humphrey Waldock suggested this usage of the term "subjective" at the meeting of rile
twenty.fourth meering of rile International Law Commission in 1966, conwsting rile use of an "ob·
jective criterion" wirll a "subjective" merllod which "depended on rile judgment of States." United
Nations Conftrence on the Law of Tr~aties, Ofji&itzl Records, 1st Sess., Summary Records of Plenary
Meetings and of Meetings of rile Camm. of the Whole. (24th mtg. of Camm. of rile Whole) at
126. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11 (1968).
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Nothing short of unanimous copsent can validate; nothing else can
invalidate in the presence of unanimity, Thus it is easy to determine
the validity of a reservation-one merely counts consenting noses. U A
purely subjective doctrine of reservations focuses on the form of the
acceptance of the reservation to determine the reservation's validity,
A purely purposive determination of the validity of a reservation has
as its sole criterion the compatibility of the substance of the reservation
with the "object and purpose" of the treaty, The key factor which
distinguishes the purposive validation from the subjective is the
rational constraint14 placed on a state's power to consent to or oppose a
reservation according to its sovereign will. U A purposive doctrine of
reservations focuses on the substance of both the reservation and the
treaty to determine the reservation's validity.
13. No one inquires into rhe reasons for consent. In a purely subjective scheme, a state's coment
is unbridled by srandards or norms in any formal way. A state need explain neirher its consent nor
its failure to consent; its clear intention one way or anorher suffices. Thus, a reserving state seeking
to assure validation of its reservation must attempr to persuade an objecting state to consent, using
arguments relating consent to rhe perceived self·interest of rhe objecting state. Argumentations be·
tween rhe reserving and rhe objecting state is of a political rarher than legal nature.
For instance, suppose in a purely subjective regime that France makes a reservation which reads
"France shall be considered a party to rhis treaty but shall not be bound by any of its terms." All
states consent. This reservation would automatically be considered valid.
14. For the purposes of this Comment. "rational constraint" is rhe constraint placed upon the
actions of any legal person by legal doerrine. The terms of rhis legal doctrine resuict that person's
power ro take actions governed by that doctrine to rhe extent rhat the law·abiding person must be
able to argue that her actions satisfy rhe terms of the doctrine. Thus, for instance, if a treaty contains
a clause permitring cerrain categories of reservations and forbidding orhers, rhe reserving state must
be able to argue by deductive logic or by analogy rhat rhe reservation belongs to the permitted
category. Opposing states would have to argue rhat the reservation belongs to rhe forbidden category.
The "objecr and purpose" test and any orher substantive requirement placed on reservations injects
rhis purposive element of rational constraint. Assuming the existence of a neutral arbiter empowered
to determine wherher rhe reservation has met rhese substantive requirements, the unanimous consent
of rhe parties is neirher necessary nor sufficient to validate rhe reservation; indeed, such coment
may be simply irrelevant. Thus, a reserving state seeking to assure validation of its reservation at·
rempts to define borh rhe reservation and the applicable standards in terms compatible one wirh
rhe other. The reserving and opposing states couch their arguments in terms of interpretation of
rerms and rhe compatibility of the reservations with the applicable standards. The argumentation
under an objective regime is legal.
For instance, suppose in a purposive regime rhat France made rhe same reservation as desctibed
above. See Jupra nore 13. Suppose further rhat it is universally agreed that the object and purpose
of the convention is to bind all parties equally. All states coment to France's reservation. The reserva·
tion is nonetheless considered invalid.
15. Evidently, a reservation's validation can never be completely subjective nor completely pur·
posive. It can never be perfectly subjective because rhe mere concept of a treaty always contains a
purposive element of rational constraint in the treaty terms rhemselves. A treaty represents the par·
ties' agreement to bind rhemselves by its terms; rhough subjectively conceived, rhe treaty once in
existence acts to constrain rationall}' rhe will of the parties. Since reservations always occur in the
COntext of a treary, it inherits rhat purposive element. for even if it is validated subjectively by the
unanimous consent of all the reacting parties, each of those parties is bound into the future by
rhe terms of rhe reseryation.
A reservation's validation can also never be completely purposive simply because a completely pur·
posive treaty would not allow reservations. If a treaty were completely purposive, so that the object
and purpose pervaded every provision, no reservation could be made rhat would be comparible with
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The purposive and subjective perspectives on reservations each imply
distinct -views of the essential nature of a multilateral convention. The
subjective view of reservations implies a conception of the multilateral
convention an.alogous to the classical nineteenth century "will theory"
of contract. 16 The purposive view of reservations implies a conception of
the multilateral convention as a normative document for the world
community somewhat .an~ogous to domestic legislation. 17
A subjective view of reservations and of the multilateral treaty rests
ultimately on the sovereign right of states to control their own
destinies unfettered by outside institutions or standards. A purposive
view of reservations and of the multilateral treaty derives ultimately
from the fact that the parties seek a shared interest that gives meaning
and purpose to the treaty. A subjective view of multilateral treaties
entitles states to make reservations with the consent of the other
parties. A purposive view of multilateral treaties allows states to agree
to modify the convention by reservation on the condition that the
reservation furthers or at least does not adversely affect the purposes
of the treaty.
These two views of multilateral conventions correspond in theory
with political visions of international relations -and legal visions of the
internation;u leg~ order. The pure subjective view of reservations and
that objeet and plllpOse. Moreover in such a purely pUlpOsive treaty, the wid of the parties would
be completely irrelevant and the rationale for reservations-the accommodation of any particular
state's disagreement with specific terms of the treaty-would command no respect. Because the con-
cept of a reservation itself assumes that some value has been placed on the will of an individual
state, a reservation would have no meaning in a purely pUlpOsive regime.
16. See, e.g.. M. HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 180-88. JUSt as consent of the individuals created
a contract regardless of the adequacy of consideration, relative bargaining power, or any other
manifestation of public policy choices, so consent of states creates a convention by joining the
sovereign wills of all the participating parties. In this view, the intervention of an outside body into
the m~ng or execution of that subjectively conceived copvention-.an international coun or other
supranational body-constitutes an unjustified intrUSion on the sovereignty of states and is thus in-
consistent with the value of state autonomy.
17. In a pUIpO$ive multilateral convention, the exercise of state sovereignty is constrained by stan-
dards agreed to by all the states. The multilateral convention, just as domestic legislation, may be
viewed as explicidy serving a common need of all the parties. Cf. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE
OF GoVERNMENT, 76, 81 (Peardon ed. 1952). It makes sense in the pUlposive view to speak of "the
object and pUlpose" of the treaty because the treaty is presumed to have one; much as United States
legislators are considered to have a discernible "legislative intent." See, e.g., H. Hart & A. Sacks,
The Legal Process 1413·16 (tent. ed. 1958)(unpublished manuscript on file in the Harvard Law
School Libf?ty); hHt see Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Lzw: Statutory Interpreta-
tion in the Supreme Court, 95 liARv. 1. REv. 892, 900 (1982)("judicial reliance on legislative pur·
pose ... is now perceived as usulpation of legislative power"). See also id. at 892 n.5. In contrast,
contracts mayor may not have a pUlpose shared by the parties. Fuller, The Forms and limits of
Adjlldz&alion, 92 liARv. 1. REv. 353, 357-8 (1978). Although in reality it may be clear that in-
dividual, separarely conceived intents may have spawned the particular convention, in general the
assumption has been made that there is at least one pre-eminent shared goal. See generally J. BEN·
TIiAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISL\TION (Ogden ed. 1931); H. Hart & A. Sacks, sllpra at 1413-16;
hilt see infra note 66. Often a convention itself states explicitly, if generally, an object and pUlpose
of the endeavor.
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of multilateral conventions implies a political order of autonomous,
sovereign states. This world of atitonomous states is safeguarded by a
legal order consisting primarily of multilateral treaties functioning as
contractual agreements among the states. The pure purposive view of
reservations and of multilateral conventions corresponds to a vision of
a world community, based on shared norms and attitudes resembling
those of a domestic society..Such a vision suggests an integrated legal
system unifying the world community, premised on shared norms and
"legislated" through multilateral conventions.
c. Permissibility and OpposabIlity
The five historical positions on the validity of reservations shall be ex-
amined in light of three criteria. First, the permissibilityl8 ofa reserva-
tion, defined here as the extent of rational constraint upon the reserv-
ing state's ability to reserve effectively, shall be examined. Permissibili-
ty depends on substantive criteria stated in legal terms. Permissibility
is the purely legal component of any historical position on reservations.
Second, the opposabilityl9 of a reservation shall be examined. Op-
posability is here defined as the degree to which the rights and obliga-
tions of the reserving state are dependent upon the actions of the react-
ing states. Opposability depends on formal criteria, which prescribe
the role of consent and the forms in which it may be manifested. Op-
posability is the purely political component of any historical position
on reservations because it measures the interaction between the reserv-
ing state and the reacting states. Permissibility and opposability
together form the test for the validity of a reservation.
Third, the legal effects of both valid and invalid reservations on the
rights and obligations of the reserving states and on its relations with
other parties shall be examined.
D. Summary of Methodology
The presence of permissibility and opposability requirements in each
of the five versions of the doctrine of reservations reveals a mixture
of legal and political elements within the particular version. These
elements suggest that each version contains two conceptions of a
multilateral treaty. These conceptions of multilateral treaties in turn
18. D.W. Bowett apparently originated the "permissibility/opposability" terminology. Bowelt,
suprll note 2, passim. Bowett considered petmissibility the "legal" element of the analysis. Jd. at
81. His approach has been expanded hetein to facilitate the comparison of the various twentielh
century versions of the docuine, so that permissibility now represents the ralional constraint on a
reserving state's power to make a reservation.
19. Bowett considered opposability the "policy" aspect of the analysis. Jd. at 87. This concepl
has also been expanded for purposes of this Comment, so that it now represents the extent to which
the rights and obligations of the reserving state are dependent upon the aclions of the reacting statcs.
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correspond to visions of the proper international legal framework and
of world society. For a version of the doctrine of reserv.ations to be
internally consistent, the political visions of multilateral treaties and
world society must match the legal vision of multilateral treaties and
the international legal framework. Thus an imbalance between the
permissibility and opposability criteria within any version of the doc-
trine signals not only .a technical inconsistency but also ultimately a
basic failure of the law to prescribe what role multilateral treaties are
to serve and in what world society and international legal framework
they are meant to function.
II. THE FIVE MAJOR VERSIONS
OF THE DOCTRINE OF RESERVATIONS
A. The Pre-League Practice and the League System
Before the creation of the League of Nations, it was an established
customary rule of international law that a reservation to a multilateral
convention had to be accepted by all the' signatory states in order to
be an admissible reservation and for the reserving state to be con-
sidered a party to the treaty.20 The Assembly of the League of Nations
adopted a resolution in 1931 which declared that "a reservation can
only be made at the moment of ratification if all the other signatory
States agree or if such a reservation has been provided for in the text
of the- Convention. tl2l
The pre-League and League versions of the doctrine of reservations
seem almost identical to each other and to the pure subjective system
of reservations discussed above.22 Cenainly by the third criterion- the
legal effects of a valid reservation and an invalid reservation-the sub-
jective system, the pre-League view, and the League view are indeed
identical. In all three views, a valid reservation renders the reserving
state a party to the treaty with its rights and obligations in relation
to all the other signatory states modified to the extent of the reserva-
tion. An invalid reservation which the reserving state refuses to
withdraw prevents the reserving state from becoming a party to the
treaty.
Although their legal effects are the same, the pre-League system and
the League system each describe a different interaction between the
criteria of permissibility and opposability. The pre-League practice set
absolutely no substantive limits on reservations and thus contained no
permissibility criterion. Opposability was the sole concern; validity
20. Ruda. Reservations to Treaties. 146 RECUEIL DES COURS 95. 112 (1975).
21. lEAGUE OF NATIONS 0.]. Spec. Supp. 93. at 139 (1931).
22. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17.
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hinged completely on the lack of'opposition to the reservation by
other parties.
The League system, on the other hand, created one category of
reservations in which permissibility superseded opposability, i.e., a
category of reservations considered instantly valid regardless of opposi-
tion from other states. This category consisted of those reservations
provided for in the text of· any given convention. Thus, the reserving
state under the League system had to reson to legal arguments in seck-
ing to demonsuate that its reservation qualified under the terms of
the convention's provision on reservations.2}
This element of rational constraint limited a state's power to oppose
a reservation. Under the League view, states were not even permitted
to oppose a reservation which fell in the category specifically provided
for in the treaty. Their prior agreement to the provision on reservations
in the treaty implied consent to this particular reservation, thus impos-
ing a legal constraint on the ability of a state to object to a reservation.
In contrast, both the pre-League and the pure subjective view made
a reservation fully opposable24 by allowing any state to oppose the reser-
vation, and by its opposition to jeopardize the reserving state's treaty
participation. Thus, the opposing state's ability to withhold or grant
its consent at will was rationally constrained under the League system.
Under the League system, a state which opposed a reservation per-
mitted by the treaty had three options. The first option was to con-
vince the other parties that the reservation was indeed not of the per-
mitted category. Second, the state could argue that the whole provi-
sion concerning permissible reservations had to be changed. Failing
these, the state could refuse to sign the treaty rather than be bound
by a repugnant reservation which the treaty terms nonetheless permit-
ted. Any of these three options required considerably more from the
opposing state than a simple "nay." In the first two cases, the oppos-
ing state had to employ legal arguments in order to block the reserva-
tion. In the second and third cases, the opposing state may have been
forced to trade off other general treaty interests or abandon the treaty
altogether for the sake of opposing one specific reservation. In short.
the League provision allowing reservations which have been specifically
provided for in the treaty demanded new and more difficult methods
by which an opposing state could block a reservation which it con-
sidered offensive to its sovereign interests.
23. Because the terms of the convention rationally constrain a state's formulation and defense of
itS reservations. this provision in the convention. though subjectively created by the consent of the
parties at some earlier stage. contains a purposive element.
24. For purposes pf this Comment. the more a reservation is "opposable," the more dependent
upon the actions of the reacting states are the relations of the reserving states.
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This limited constraint possible in the League system should not
obscure the fundamental subjectivity of both the pre-League and
League views, both on a theoretical level and in comparison with their
historical companions.2~ Not even the League system contained any kind
of permissibility criterion imposing universal objective standards upon
parties wishing to make a reservation. And all three systems not only
imposed the severest of consequences-denial of participation in the
treaty-upon a state making an invalid reservation, but in addition
made it relatively easy for an opposing state seeking to make a reserva-
tion invalid.
The pre-League and League systems sought to create a treaty of
substantially uniform multilateral obligations despite the existence of
a reservation expressing one state's departure from the treaty terms.
The unanimous consent requirement was· expected to insure this
uniformity by demanding that all the parties not oppose any valid
reservation. A treaty having such substantia.l:ly uniform obligations,
safeguarded in part by a unanimous consent requirement,26 has been
termed a treaty of "absolute integrity."27.If domestic law or other in-
superable obstacles prevented some states fro~ accepting the treaty in
its entirety, then the "integrity" of the treaty could still survive, pro-
vided that the principle of unanimous consent which brought the trea-
ty into being could also endorse these occasional individual
modifications.28
Nevertheless, the principle of unanimous consent does not necessar-
ily imply a treaty of absolute integrity. As will be seen below in the
analysis of the Pan-American system, a subjective system cannot
guarantee such a meaningfu1 broad-based consensus among the par-
ties. No limits on the scope of the reservation exist to ensure that the
reserving state's exceptions to the treaty will be incidental. Indeed,
although the absolute integrity view of the multilateral treaty seemed
at Hrst to follow from the principle of unanimous consent, this princi-
ple instead could have prevented rather than protected the absolute
integrity of a treaty in the League system.29 Analysis of the Pan-
25. While the League system did provide this accommodation for treaties with provisions on reser-
vations, it is reasonable to assume that the scope of the resetV:1tions specifically permitted in the
treaty would be limited, because p:ttties would want to al10w for only minor deviations from the
provisions of the treaty.
26. lloth the league and pre-League systems had a unanimous consent requirement, but the
League's requirement was limited to those treaties which did not provide specificaily for reservations.
See supra text accompanying note 21.
27. "Absolute integrity" is the International CoUtt of Justice's (International Court) characteriza-
tion of the principle underlying the League vieW. Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Ad·
visory Opinion. [1951] I.CJ. 15. 24.
28. See infra Appendix p. 112.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 46-47.
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American system reveals the paradoxical conflict between the pure sub-
jective position on reservations and the absolute integrity view of the
multilateral treaty which it was believed to imply.
B. The Pan-American System
In 1932, the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union, the precur-
sor of the Organization of"American States (OAS), provisionally ac-
cepted a new system of rules on the juridical effects of reservations,
known as the Pan-American system.30 While this system was never for-
mally approved by an Inter-American Conference, it was followed in
practice by the Pan-American Union and by the OAS from its birth
until 1973.31 The core ofthe system was contained in three rules concern-
ing "the juridical effects of reservations":
1. The treaty shall be in force, in the form in which'it was sign-
ed, as between those countries which ratify it without reservations
in the terms in which it was originally drafted and signed.
2. It shall be in force as between the governments which ratify
it with reservations and the signatory States which accept the
reservations in the form in which the treaty may be modified by
said reservations.
3. It shall not be in force between a government which may have
ratified with reservations and another which may have already
ratified, and which does not accept such reservations. 32
Like the pre-League and pure subjective systems, the Pan-American
system contained no permissibility criterion. In fact, the second and
third rules of the Pan-American system drew no absolute distinction
between "valid" and "invalid" reservations; they distinguished solely
between reservations which have and those which have not been
accepted." The Pan-American system prescribed no substantive limits on
the content of reservations.
The second and third rules made opposability the essential criterion
of the validity of a reservation in the Pan-American system. But the
Pan-American system established a new concept of individual op-
posability which in turn created a doctrine of "piecemeal validity." A
Pan-American reservation was only individually opposable because a
30. Ruda. supra note 20. at 118·20.
31. It/. at 120·21.
32. These three roles are quoted by the International CoUll in its Genocide Convention Opinion
without citing an original soutce. See ReuTl/ations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish·
ment of the Crime of Genocide. (1951] I.eJ. Pleadings 5. 17.
33. This terminology tefleetS the highly subjective flavor of the Pan·Ametican system.
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single state by its opposition could affect only its individual relations
with the reserving state. The validity of the reservation, previously an
all-or-nothing determination was now a matter determined anew be-
tween the reserving state and each reacting state. A single reservation
could be valid vis-a-vis one state and invalid vis-a-vis another.
In comparison with the pre-League and League systems, this varia-
tion on the subjective view weakened the dependence of the reserving
state's rights and obligations upon the actions of the reacting states.
In the Pan-American system, nothing rationally constrained the exer-
cise of the opposing state's subjective will. On the other hand, the
opposing state was legally powerless to affect the relations between the
reserving state and any other state.34 In a sense the Pan-American
system, also dependent on subjective criteria of validity, nevertheless
turned the pure subjective/pre-League standard on its head. According
to the pure subjective view, only unanimous consent could make a
reservation valid. Under the piecemeal validity doctrine of the Pan-
American system, only unanimous opposition could make a reservation
completely invalid.
The Pan-American system also contained a doctrine of the piecemeal
effectiveness of reservations. Although the first two tules reiterate the
League tules of reservations, the third tule created a new concept of
a treaty's piecemeal entry into force.
One commentator notes that the system was "an iclectic solution,
lying between the Havana Convention and the practice of the League
of Nations."3) Under the Havana Convention on Treaties,36 which
preceded the Pan-American system but never gained widespread
acceptance,37 the reserving and opposing states could delete the offending
clauses from their treaty relations, yet allow the unrelated clauses of
the treaty to enter into force between them. 38 Thus, some treaty rela-
tions, even if minimal, were created between the reserving state and
every other party to the treaty. Under the League practice if any state
objected to a reservation, no treaty relations were created between the
reserving state and any other state. In the Pan-American system, rela-
tions were created between the reserving state and any consenting
state, and no relations were created between the reserving state and
34. Only by altering the terms of the treaty (and thus the terms of its own relations with other
parties) could the opposing state affect the relations between the reserving and consenting states.
35. Ruda. supra note 20. at 119.
36. Havana Convention on Treaties of 1928. Pan·Am. T.S. No. 34. reprinted in 22 AM.]. INT'L
L. Supp. 138 (1928).
37. Ruda. supra note 20. at 117·18.
38. As will be seen below, article 21(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides
for similar segregation of provisions that relate to reservations from those that do not. Vienna Con·
vention on the Law of Treaties. opened /or signature May 23, 1969, art. 21, para. 3, reprinted in
8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 679. 688 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention).
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any opposing state. This compromise position resulted in the "legal
anomaly" that two states could be parties to the same treaty, even
though no treaty relations whatsoever existed between them. 39
The multilateral treaty that the Pan-American system described
could have been just a conglomerate of bilateral treaties, only vaguely
resembling each other. Unanimity was achieved in one sense, because
most of the parties had signed the treaty in some form or other.
Nonetheless, this unanimity was really an empty concept, because
there was no purposive element in the Pan-American system. The rela-
tions between one pair of states would not necessarily bear any
resemblance to the relations between any other pair of states. In con-
trast, in the pure subjective system, one could be sure that the
resulting relations between any two parties to a certain convention
shared some common elements with the relationship of any other pair.
And, if one party had made a reservation that had been· accepted by
all the other parties, relations between all the other parties and the
reserving party would have been uniformly modified.40
This examination of the Pan-American view reveals how the subjec-
tive approach and the pre-League and League views ultimately fail to
produce a treaty of absolute integrity. For although the Pan-American
system more clearly permitted the possibility of disparate bilateral
39. Ruda, supra note 20, at 122.
40. The difference between a League system treaty and a Pan·American system treaty can be
visualized with the help of a hypothetical case. Assume that five states negotiate a treaty with three
clauses. Upon ratification, three states make reservations: (1) B reseIVes that clause I does not apply
to B. A opposes B's reseIVation; (2) D reseIVes that clause II does not apply to D. E opposes D's
reseIVation; (3) E reserves that clause III does not apply to E. No one opposes. Assume further that
B's reseIVation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty and that D and E's melVa·
tions are compatible.
In the League system, B and D would not be panies to the treaty. E's relations with A and C
are modified by the reservation (therefore clause II does not apply) and A and C enjoy full treaty
relations. Every set of bilateral relations between the treaty parties (here A, C, and E) share a com·
lOon e1emenr with every other set; in this case, clauses I and II. Picturing the treaty as a model
in three dimensions, these three clauses linking the states could be seen as three parallel strings con·
necting wooden POSts standing unanchored on a flat surface. The whole structure. representing the
multilateral treaty, is kept erect by the tensions of the strings evenly distributed around the structute.
Under the hypothetical in the League system, all the treaty ties of parties with Band D have been
snipped as have the clause III ties between E and A and between E and C. But because of the
tensions still distributed evenly among the panies in clauses I and II, the three·post SlructUre remains
srable and standing.
Under the Pan·American system, B and D would be allowed ro be parties to rhe treaty and to
have treaty relations with those who accept rheir reseIVations. Thus, while between A and Band
between D and E no relations exisr, modified treaty relations exisr among the rescIVing and accepting
states. The remaining sets of bilateral relations arc widely differing: the relations belween Band
E and between B and D contain one clause, relations between A and C contain three clauses, and
other sets of bilateral relations conrain two. No clause involves all the panies, and four of the parties
have no relations at all with one of the other panies to the treaty. In the three dimensional structure,
the lack of an e1emenr shared by all sets of bilateral relations is manifested by the lack of one suing
distributing tension equally among all panies. The structure (i.e.. the multilateral treaty) that results
is unstable and may well fall to the ground with only the bilateral connections inract.
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commitments forming among the parties to a multilateral treaty, the
subjective, pre-League, and League views could lead to the same
result. Since there is no limit on the scope of a reservation, a state
could legitimately make a reservation radically altering the bulk of its
obligations if it could cajole all the other parties into accepting the
reservation.41 Although a common thread would run through all sets of
relations (since no state would be a party to a treaty and then alter
the entire agreement through a reservation), it might indeed be a very
fragile thread. Thus in theory, the pure subjective view of reservations
as well as the Pan-American system permits the multilateral treaty to
become little more than an aggregate of independent, disparate
bilateral treaties.
This theoretical possibility reveals the paradox of cl}e pure subjective
system. With "unanimous consent" as its governing principle and a
treaty of "absolute integrity" as its desired end, the pure subjective
view seems to suggest a new kind of multilateral treaty. Turn of the
century international legal scholars may well have thought that
unanimity would prove to be the link of legi~acy bridging a world
of bilateral agreements and absolute state ~overeignty on the one
hand, and the nascent international community on the other. No one
state would be able to challenge the legitimacy of a convention to
which all had agreed; one could conceive of each pair of parties sign-
ing a bilateral agreement which turned out to be identical to a
number of other bilateral treaties.
The element of uniformity which seemed to be implied by the prin-
ciple of unanimous consent nevertheless transformed the traditional vi-
sions of the world by introducing an element of collective commitment
which would keep the multilateral treaty a stable, unified structure.
The principle, however, prescribed a rule of reservations that would
deny a multilateral treaty any shared community norms which give it
a distinct essence42 by destroying the certainty of uniform obligations
among the parties. The logical extension of the principle of unanimous
consent thus weakens, rather than supports, the unique new concept
of the multilateral treaty that the principle at first seemed to imply.
Despite the loss of unanimity and uniformity under the Pan-
American system, at least one commentator concluded that the system
achieves a valuable compromise. According to Judge J. M. Ruda of
the International Court ofJustice (International Court), it w~ accepted
that the drafters of the Pan-American system successfully combined the
41. Though this situation may seem absutd. since a state interested in adhering to so few of the
treaty's negotiated provisions would probably not have joined the treaty at all. it was theoretically
possible.
42. For purposes of this Comment. a multilateral treaty has a distinct essence when it is more
than the sum of its bilateral parts. Su infra Appendix p. llO.
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"possibilities of maximum participation"43 with "the recognition that
reservations could not be imposed on the other parties to a treaty
against their wiIl.,,44 Ruda concludes that, in so doing, the drafters
displayed a sensitivity to the "evolution of the international
community.,,4s Once again, the familiar theme of protection of state
sovereignty is in tension with the theme of the growth of the interna-
tional community.
Upon closer scrutiny of the Pan-American system, Ruda's optimism
seems misplaced. In fact, the Pan-American system favored those prin-
ciples safeguarding state sovereignty over those promoting international
integration. It encouraged reservations by making the sanction for an
invalid or unaccepted reservation much less severe than the sanction
of total exclusion described in the League system.46 In general, the
Pan-American system effectively guards each state, whether reserving,
consenting or objecting, from the intrusion and even indirect control
of all the others. Each pair of states strikes its own bargain with a
substantial degree of independence from other states.
In its zeal to protect state sovereignty, the Pan-American system
-sacrificed its power to ensure that all the states would be equally
bound by any legal norms and thus stripped the multilateral treaty
of its element of community. Maximum participation became a mirage
as well, because all the parties to the treaty could in fact have little
in common. In shon, the Pan-American system did not ensure that
the multilateral treaty would embody community norms or represent
more than the simple aggregate of many minimally related bilateral
treaties.
C. The Genocide Convention Opinion
In 1950, a United Nations General Assembly resolution47 requested
the International Coun of Justice to answer three questions regarding
the validity and legal effects of reservations to the Convention on the
Preservation and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide
Convention).48 Although the International Court's Advisory Opinion49
43. Ruda. Il1pra note 20. at 121.
44. Id.
4S. Id. at 132.
46. The Pan·American system prevented any opposing state ftom single.handedly destroying all
the reserving state's treaty relations with other consenting states. but it also saved the opposing stale
from being bound to the teservations of another state which have been found unacceptable.
47. G.A. Res. 478. 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 74. U.N. Doe. A/C.6/L.125 (1950). In
the same resolution. the General Assembly invited the International Law Commission "to study the
question of teservations to multilateral conventions both from the point of view of codification and
from that of the progressive development of international law." Id.
48. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for
signa/lire Dec. 9. 1948. 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
49. Reservations to the Convention on Genocide. Advisory Opinion. (1951] I.C.). 15. 29, The
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(Genocide Convention Opinion) did not set forth a system of reserva-
tions, it clearly merits attention here not only as background for the
International Law Commission's system, to be analyzed below, but also
because it represents the historical moment at which the rhetoric and
reasoning of all discussion of reservations fundamentally changed.
The most striking feature of the Genocide Convention Opinion is
its enunciation of the "object and purposes" test. Simply stated, the
doctrine declared a reservation valid or invalid by reference to its com-
patibility with the object and purposes of the treaty. 50 The Interna-
tional Court thereby introduced purposive words51 into the vocabulaty
of reservations, which had previously been dominated by the term
"consent."
The International Court did not elaborate on the object and pur-
poses test, and in particular, failed to resolve.three fundamental issues:
first, the proof of the existence of an object and purpose to the treaty;
second, the identity of the party or arbiter who< determines the object
and purpose; and third, the related question of the compatibility of
any given reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty.
With regard to the first issue, the International'Court simply assum-
ed that the treaty had an object and purpose.~2For the first time in the
doctrine of reservations, purposive language had invoked quasi-
legislative visions of the multilateral treaty. The International Court
drew a distinction between the contractual view of the multilateral
conventionB and the normative, "humanitarian" or "civilizing"
convention.54 The traditional contractual treaties dealt in terms of "in-
Coun advised that with respect to the validity of reservations under the Genocide Convention,
a State which has made and maintained a reservation which has been objected to by one or
more of the parties to the Convel.tion but not by others, can be regarded as being a pany
to the Convention if the reservation is compatible with th~ object and purpose ofthe Conven·
tion; othelWise, that State cannot b~ regarded as being a party to the Convention.
It/. at 29 (emphasis added).
As to the legal effects of opposition to reservations, the Coun advised:
(a) that if a pany to the Convention objects to a reservation which it considers to be incompati.
ble with the object and putpose of the Convention, i. can in fact consider that the reserving
State is not a party to rhe Convention;
(b) that if, on the orher hand, a party accepts the reservation as being compatible wirh the
object and putpose of the Convention, it can in faCt consider that the reserving State is a pany
to the Convention.
It/. at 29·30.
50. It/. at 29·30.
51. Reservations to the Convention on Genocide. Advisoty Opinion, (1951) I.C,}. 15,
22·25. While the analysis logically extends the putposive style of treaty intetpretarion used by the
International Coun, its specific application to the doctrine of teservations was wholly new.
52. This is the approach to domestic statutoty intetpretation taken by Han & Sacks, supra note
17 at 1413·16. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 58 & 66 and accompa.
nying text.
53. Reservations ro the Convention on Genocide. Advisoty Opinion. (1951) I.C,}. 15, 22. 24. See
also it/. at 51 (Alvarez, ]., dissenting).
54. It/. at 23.
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dividual advantages and disadvantages to states, or of the maintenance
of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties" n ofstates.
Such a treaty results from the bargaining of two parties pursuing in-
dividually conceived ends, and therefore does not necessarily contain
an object and purpose.~6
Conversely, in a humanitarian convention such as the Genocide
Convention, "the high ideals which inspired the Convention provide,
by virtue of the common will of the parties, the foundation and
measure of all its provisions."~7 The International Court observed that
a common object or purpose, not self interest, leads parties to create
a humanitarian convention. ~8
The revolutionary nature of this purposive view of the treaty did not
escape the judges, who challenged traditional notions of state
sovereignty. In such a convention the contracting states are not pursu-
ing narrow, individual interests; they instead have a common interest,
namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the
raison d'etre of the convention. Consequently, the International Court
concluded, in a convention of this type one cannot speak of individual
advantages or disadvantages to states, or of the maintenance of a
perfect contractual balance between rights and duties of states. ~9
Regarding the second question of who determines the object and
purpose of a treaty and tlle third related question of whether a reserva-
tion is compatible with that object and purpose, the majority of the
International Court stated:
As no state can be bound by a reservation to which it has not
consented, it necessarily follows that each State objecting to it will
or will not, on the basis of its individual appraisal within the
limits of the criterion of the object and purpose stated above,
consider the reserving State to be a party to the Convention. In
the ordinary course of events, such a decision will only affect the
relationship between the State making the reservation and the ob-
jecting State.60
The International Court here apparently sought to reconcile the subjec-
tive demands of classical treaty doctrine with its new objective
element.
55. Id.
56. Fuller calls this form of ordering "organization by reciprocity," or creating a bargain effective
only because the "panicipants want different things." Fuller. supra note 17, at 357·58.
57. Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion, (1951) l.e.]. 15. 23.
58. Id. Fuller terms this form of ordering "organization by common aims." or a cooperation in
which "the panicipal\ts want the same thing or things." Fuller. supra note 17. at 357·58. See supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
59. Reservations to the Convention on Genocide. Advisory Opinion, (1951) l.e.]. 15. 23.
60. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
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This attempt at reconciliation created tw<Y anomalies in the
jurisprudence' of reservations developed up to this point. First, it
severed the previous legitimate connection between a state's opposition
to the reservation and its rationally unconstrained. sovereign will.61 A
state. now had to justify its opposition in legal terms' describing its vi-
sion of the object and purpose of the multilateral convention. Its
sovereignty was penetrated by an external standard which rationally
limited its ability to invalidate another state's reservation at will. Thus,
at the same time that the International Court reaffirmed the principle
that no state can be bound by a reservation to which it has not
consented,62 the International Court transformed the ability of a state to
consenr.
The- International Court created the second anomaly when it asserted.
that each reservation has one essential nature at its core, either com-
patible or incompatible with the treaty's object and purpose, but then
ignored the fact that there could be multiple and very possibly conflict-
ing perceptions of that nature by other parties.63 This anomaly in turn
destroyed the uniformity of the treaty and· proliferated the defmitions
of the treaty's object and purpose. First, leaving the judgment of com-
patibility to a number of independent arbiters, each with its own in-
dividual political considerations at stake, put the reserving states at the
mercy of the calculations and legal agility of the other parties. While
the appointment of a single arbiter64 to determine the singular nature
of the treaty seems highly sensible, the International Court could not
bring itself to suggest such an arrangement. Without such a neutral
arbiter, the extreme result possible under the Pan-American system
could also result under the Genocide Convention Opinion approach;
several pairs of parties to the treaty could have had no relations be-
tween them, while other palrs exchanged full relations. This is hardly
the uniformly binding, normative convention the judges envisioned.
Second, the object and purpose of a treaty and compatibility
therewith may be variously defmed. The majority believed that one
"clear assumption" would prevent such chaos: the assumption that
"the contracting States are desirous of preserving intact at least what
is essential to the object of the Convention.,,65 Given the politics of
treaty-making and the overriding, divergent individual interests of the
states, it is hard to be as sanguine.66
61. Although opposing states may still be acting oUt of their subjective interest, the mere fact
that they must now couch their objections to reservations in terms of the compatibility of the reserva-
tion with the object and purpose of the treaty represents an element of rational constraint. See supra
note 14 and accompanying text.
62. Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion. (1951) I.eJ. 15. 21.
63. 10. at 26-27.
64. 10. at 21-26.
65. 10. at 27.
66. It is conceivable that states have signed the treary with no regard for its object and purpose.
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The two anomalies illustrate vividly the perils of mixing subjective
and purposive views of reservations. The Genocide Convention Opin-
ion approach provided enough rational constraint to interfere with
the exercise of a state's sovereign will, but toO little to breath life into
the concept of a universally recognized object and purpose of each
treaty. The dissenters pointed out that "integrity of the terms of the
Convention" was sacrificed for "mere universality in its acceptance;"67
and as the comparison to the Pan-American system suggests, univer-
sality of acceptance does not guarantee that the parties to the treaty
truly have anything in common. The Genocide Convention resulting
from the International Coun's suggestions would be a fragmented
commitment, interpreted in various inconsistent ways by frustrated
pattIes.
Thus, although the Genocide Convention Opinion ushered in a new
form of reasoning and a new vision of multilateral treaties,' the opinion
at the same time foreshadowed the limitations of a mixed subjec-
tive/purposive approach. It boldly introduced purposive analysis,
multiplied the categories of multilateral treaties,68 and attacked ex-
treme claims of state sovereignty, but then struggled to coax these new
square purposive pegs into old subjective round holes. Both their in-
novations and their failures survived in the International Law Commis-
sion's flexible system and the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Vienna Convention).69
D. The International Law Commission's Flexible System
A new approach to reservations to multilateral treaties was suggested
by Sir Humphrey Waldock in a 1962 repon (Waldock Report) to the
International Law Commission (ILC).70 This approach, which has been
termed "the flexible system,,,n was never put into effect, but did in-
or that states have widely differing views on the nature of the object and purpose. Kennedy argues,
in the context of domestic legislation, that legislative decisions do not necessarily have a universally
recognized object and purpose. Kennedy. Legal Formality, supra note 5, at 356. Legislarive decisions
instead reflect the "natural 'surround' that determines the force of the compering values or intereSlS,
rather than the specific intention of a particular actor:' Id. at 358. Since the legislature approves
them only as a whole, legislarive decisions mUSt be considered as a whole. Ii. at 368·69. Its essence,
therefore, cannot be reduced to its supposed object and purposes.
67. Reservarions to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion, (1951) I.e.). 15. 46 (Ioint
Dissenting Opinion).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 53-58.
69. Vienna Convention, supra note 38, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 679 (1969).
70. Report to the International Law Commission on the Conclusion_ E"try into Force and Registra·
tion of Treaties, (1962) II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 60-68 [hereinafter cired as lPaldock Report). This
report drew on the work begun by the International Law Commission (ILC) following rhe invitation
by the General Assembly in 1951, but largely rejected the approaches of Sir Hersh Lauterpacht and
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. Waldock's immediate predecessors as Rapporteurs of the Commission. Ruda,
supra note 20, at 161-67.
71. This new approach is contained in three of the proposed articles suggested in the lPaldock
Report. lPaldock Report, supra note 70, at 60·62, arts. 17·19.
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fluence the drafters of the Vienna Convention in their codification of
the law 'of treaties.
The flexible system presupposed .a classification of treaties according
to the number of signatory parties. A "bilateral" treaty was, as always,
a treaty between two parties.72 The term "plurilateral" treaty73 described
a treaty restricted to .a few participants with provisions dealing with
matters of concern only to those parties. "Multilateral" treaty74 re-
ferred to:
. . . a treaty which, by its terms or by the terms of a related
instrument, has either been made open to participation to any
state without restriction, or has been made open to participation
by a considerable number of parties and either purports to lay
down general norms of international law or to deal in a general
manner with matters of general concern' to other states as well as
to the parties to the treaty.7~
The provisions of the flexible system have been charted below.76
The salient characteristics may be briefly summarized: Bilateral treaties
demanded the consent of the other party for v.aIidation of the reserva-
tion, which then became a new term of the treaty. For plurilateral
treaties, a reservation did not need to meet any permissibility re-
quirements and had to be accepted by all the parties. The reservation
therefore would have had the effect of modifying the relations be-
tween .the reserving state and every other state, as in the League
system.77 For "multilateral" treaties, the requirements nearly duplicated
those of the Pan-American system, since a reservation did not need
to meet any permissibility requirements; must have been accepted by
at least one other party, anel would have had the effect of modifying
the relations between the reserving state and every state that accepts
the reservation. As the League and Pan-American systems have been
analyzed above, the analysis here 'shall concentrate on the three new
contributions of the flexible system to the permissibility and op-
posability requirements. First, the reserving state now had a duty to
72. ld. at 31, art. l{d).
73. ld.
74. For purposes of this Comment, "multilateral" treaty in quotation marks will refet to the
specific International Law Commission definition; multilateral treaty otherwise refers to the general
categoty.
75. Waldock Report, supra note 70, at 31, art. l{d) (emphasis added).
76. The chart on the following page summarizes the major provisions of the Waldock Report.
See supra note 70. The chart excludes definitions of consent, special regulations for constituent in-
struments of international organizations, and the formal procedure on reservations.
77. The chief differences berween the League requirements and the requirements for plurilateral
treaties lie in the International Law Commission requirement that a state shall have regard to the
object and purpose of the treaty, the ILC provisions on implied consent, and the ILC special provi-
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have regard for the object and purpose of the treaty in formulating
reservations. Second, detailed definitions were now given for express
and implied consent. Third, special consent requirements were
established for conventions which were constituent instruments of in-
ternational organizations.
Article 17(2)(a) of the Waldock Repon set forth a requirement that
a reserving state "shall have regard to the compatibility of the reserva-
tion with the object and purpose of the treaty."78 This added an addi-
tional, if mild, purposive element to the permissibility requirement.
The flexible system required much less purposive consideration than
did the International Coun in the Genocide Convention Opinion.
While in that opinion the International Coun wanted all states,
whether reserving, consenting, or opposing, to ponder the object and
purpose of the treaty at hand, the flexible system imposed that duty
only upon the reserving state. The reacting states presumably could
have reacted as their subjective will dictated, free from the duty to
justify their consent or opposition in legal terms. The rights and
obligations of the reserving state were still vety dependent upon the
actions of the reacting states. Thus the flexi~le system had an over-
whelmingly subjective tone.
But this requirement, however mild, did take the flexible system a
quantum leap in the purposive direction. For even if only one state
had to consider the object and purpose, the flexible system made the
same crucial assumption as the International Coun had made in its
Genocide Convention Opinion: that there exists a universally recogniz-
ed object and purpose to be discerned. The flexible system imagined
a common will on the pan of the treaty signatories and, consequently,
a community bound by this common will. Indeed, even bilateral
treaties were assumed to have had an object and purpose, transcending
mere reciprocity.79 "Multilateral" treaties were defined as those proposing
to layout general norms, approaching the level of legislation. Thus
with one small stroke, the flexible system created communal relations
among the panies to the treaty. The application of the League and
Pan-American requirements, while familiar, will have to be considered
in this new light.
To the opposability requirement, the flexible system added the new
feature of implied consent.80 The flexible system described in detail both
express and implied consent. Article 18(2)(a) of the Waldock Repon
described the formal mechanisms by which a state expressly consents
78. Waldock Report, supra note 70, at 60, art. 17(2)(a).
79. See supra notcs 61-62.
80. Although the Pan·American dtafters, among others, had discussed implied consent earlier,
Ruda reportS that the concept was always controversial. Ruda, supra note 20, at 165.
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to a reservation. Consent to general treaty provisions which authorized
a category of reservations was classified by article 18(2)(b) as express
consent to any specific reservation of that category which was made
thereafter.
Article 18(3)(a), which 9.efined implied consent, provided that a
party that had not necessarily consented to the general treaty provision
authorizing a category of reservations but which did not object to a
reservation falling in that category was to be deemed to have con-
sented. Paragraph 3(b) set deadlines by which time a state had to give
notice of its objection, but loosened the requirements somewhat in the
case of a multilateral treaty and a ratifying or acceding state. Paragraph
3(c) defined implied consent for acceding states. In the case of a
plurilateral treaty, performing all the acts necessary for the state to
become party to the treaty implied its consent to a reservation already
formulated. In the case of a "multilateral" treaty, performing all the
acts necessary for the state to become party to the treaty without signi-
fying an objection implied the state's acceptance of the reservation.
Although these definitions of express and implied consent merely
refined the essentially subjective concept, they also imposed external
constraints on the state's right to consent or object at any time for any
reason. While theoretically there should be no time limits on a state's
right to object to another state's reservation, now a state had to watch
the clock while reaching its position on each reservation. Moreover I
these categories of express and implied consent tended to standardize
intent, making the form and not the substance of will the key
element.8 ! Gradually, a state's idiosyncratic will could easily have gotten
lost in the shuffle of its own formal carelessness and an independent
arbiter's duty to look no further than form alone. Thus the flexible
system's attempt to formalize consent ran the risk of inadvertently
thwarting the subjective wills of the states.
The flexible system contained a third innovation in its special provi-
sion for plurilateral or multilateral treaties which are "constituent in-
strument[s] of an international organization." 82 Waldock added special
requirements in the opposability criteria in both the consent and ob·
jection provisions. Article 18(4)(c) required in both plurilateral and
multilateral treaties that consent of the organization itself was
necessary to admit a reservation and to make the reserving state a party
to the treaty. Article 19(4)(d) provided that "the decision of the com-
81. Horwitz. in lectutes on United States legal history from the Civil War ro the present. has
called this concern with outwatd manifestations of will the "objective" view of contract. His "subjec.
tive" view of contract is the domestic counterpart of the "subjective" view of multilateral treaties
as used in this Comment. M. Horwitz. Lectures on American Legal History. given at the Harvard
Law School (Fall. 1980).
82. Wa/dock Report. supTa note 70. at 61. art. 18(4)(c).
HeinOnline -- 23 Harv. Int’l. L. J.  93 1982-1983
1982 / Comments 93
petent organ of the organization rejecting the reservation shall exclude
the reserving state from participation in the treaty."S3
This is the third time in the twentieth-century discussion of reserva-
tions that lawmakers have divided multilateral conventions into dif-
ferent categories. The International Court in the Genocide Convention
Opinion distinguished contractual from humanitarian treaties; the
Waldock Report initially divided the universe of conventions into three
categories based upon the number of signatories. Now from within
two of these numerical categories, the flexible system identifies a
fourth category.84 The inclusion of a new actor, the international
organization, set this species of treaty apart from the rest.S5
While the flexible system consistently muted the subjective power
of the reacting states, it zealously safeguarded the subjective
prerogative of the international organization. No formal deadlines
limited the organization's ability to consent or object; consent was
never implied from any less than an outright decision of its competent
organ. Most remarkably, the system made the organization's consent
ctuc~al to the reservation's admissibility in· the case of a "multilateral"
treaty. Without the organization's consent, me treaty as modified
could not go into effect even as between the-reserving state and any
consenting states.
Thus, the system broadly guarded the right ofstates to accept reser-
vations and relations with reserving states regardless cf the actions of
other states, but specifically prohibited states from so doing under the
treaty "in the face of the organization's disapproval.s6 The organiza-
tion's decision additionally constrained the state's power to exercise its
subjective will. Now, in order to be permitted to establish relations
with the reserving state under the treaty, assuming that acceptance of
the reservation required a majority of member states, the consenting
83. [d. at 62, an. 19(4)(d).
84. This founh type of convention is imponam even in those tteaties whete the individual
signatories are identical with the membership of the international organization. Since the founh type
requires only the consent of the organization to validate a reservation, generally a majority of the
states will suffice. Thus states in the minority who opposed the reservation would be bound to
recognize its validity despite theit clear opposition. This is the first suggestion in the doctrine of
reservations that a state could be bound against its sovereign will. See infra text accompanying nOte
109.
85. Conceivably. any two states by themselves could sign a bilateral treaty resembling the
multilateral treaty but with the reservation in play. The fact that this does not seem quite the same
as signing a multilateral treaty. even though the effect in that kind of case would be almost iden-
tical, reinforces the intuition that a multilateral treaty contains something extra that a batch of
bilateral treaties containing the same provisions cannot duplicate.
86. Anicle 18(4)(c) makes this clear:
In the case of a plurilateral or multilateral treaty which is the constituent instrument of an
international organization, the consent of the organization, expressed through a decision of its
competent organ, shall be necessary to establish the admissibility of a reservation not specifically
authorized by such instrument, and to constitute the reserving State a pany to the instrument.
Waldoch Report, JUpTa note 70, at 61.
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state not only had to consent itself but also had to persuade through
legal argumentation a majority of its colleagues to vote to accept the
reservation.
Since it would be rare for any state individually to reject a reserva-
tion but vote to accept it as a member of the international organiza-
tion, it is unlikely under this provision of the flexible system that a
reserving state would be allowed to have treaty relations with less than
half of the states. Under the Pan-American system, such a state of af-
fairs was theoretically possible. To achieve the same result under article
19(4)(d) of the flexible system, some very persuasive political jawbon-
ing was required. The evolution of the reservations doctrine from the
Pan-American to the flexible system shows the growing role of the
theme of international community. It is to be expected that this theme
would be the strongest in those multilateral treaties that pertain to in-
ternational organizations, which are the closest to the realization of in-
ternational communities in this century.
Although these three innovations taken together served to constrain
each state's subjective will, it is imponant to emphasize that the orien-
.tation of the flexible system remained overwhelmingly subjective.
Apan from those treaties where tacit consent and international
organizations were involved, the sole purposive elements of the flexible
system were the normative definition of "multilateral" treaty, the re-
quirement that a reserving state regard the object and purpose of the
treaty and the provision that treaties may themselves provide specially
for reservations. But for these elements, one would be thrust back into
the rules of the earlier, more subjective systems. Consent was still
clearly the linchpin of the reservation mechanism.
The flexible system reveals no coherent picture of multilateral
treaties. The highly normative definition of "multilateral" treaties, in
contrast to the more cut-and-dried numerical description of plurilateral
treaties, suggests that Waldock meant to distinguish between nor-
mative and contractual treaties. "Multilateral" treaties assumed a
legislative function for the sake of the common weal.87 But the actual
changes in the doctrine hardly lived up to its revolutionary potential.
The subtle restraints imposed on the reacting states were too wealc to
transform the "multilateral" treaty into a community endeavor.
Waldock's one explicit invocation of the object and purposes test was
an even more milquetoast version of the International Coun's tentative
formulation in 1951. Most significantly, the system of reservations
which Waldock provided for in this new normative treaty mirrored the
Pan-American system, which allowed fragmented, non-uniform, and
highly individualized treaty commitments. Actual treaties concluded
87. Su Iupra notes 17. 52. 58. and 66 and accompanying text.
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under the flexible system of reservations might well have resembled
an aggregate of haphazardly related bilateral treaties rather than world
legislation.
In the end, the flexible system contained enough purposive
elements to confuse any subjective analysis, but failed in any substan-
tial way to balance the weight of state sovereignty notions with the
pull of the vision of an international community. Its hybrid orienta-
tion, however, formed the uneven foundation upon which the current
international law on reservations, codified in the Vienna Convention,
is built.
E. The Vienna Convention Doctrine
Twenty years of research, deliberation, and negotiation on the law of
treaties culminated in 1969 in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,88 which entered into force in]anuary 1980. The Vienna Conven-
tion doctrine of the law of reservations is the 'most elaborate of this
century. As a result, its interpretation has created controversy and
outright disagreement among contemporary legal scholars. These
disagreements stem directly from the tensions- between the purposive
and subjective elements embedded in the doctrine.
The Vienna Convention doctrine on reservations is contained in ar-
ticles 19 through 23 of the convention. The chart below presents the
provisions regarding "formulation and acceptance" of the
reservations89 and the legal effects of reservations.90
The Vienna Convention lays out its permissibility criterion in article
19.91 This article divides the universe of treaties into two categories: those
88. Vienna Convention, supra note 3°, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 679 (1969). The treaty
entered into force upon ratification by the thiny-fifth state :n 1980. Although over half of the
signatory states, including the United Srates, have yet formally to ratify the convention. it is genera!.
ly accepted that the convention is "already recognized as the authoritative guide to current treary
law and practice." United States President. Message from the President transmining the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties to Congress. S. ExEc. Doc. 1.. 92d Cong.• 1st Sess. 1 (1971). Thus
the Vienna Convention may be considered a codification of ir:ternational law which represents binding
law for all states.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 96-102.
90. The charr on the following page summarizes the major provisions of the Vienna Convention
reservarion arricles. See Vienna Convenrion supra note 38. reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 679
(1969). The charr excludes tacit consent. withdrawal, and procedure on reservations.
91. Anicle 19 States:
Fonnulation of reservations
A State may. when signing, ratifying, accepting. approving or acceding to a treaty. formulate
a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treary;
(b) the treary provides that only specified reservations. which do not include the reservation
in question. may be made; or
(c) in cases not falling under sub·paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treacy.
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which provide specially for reservations and those which do not. Pro-
hibited ,reservations or those not specifically allowed· (in those treaties
providing that only specified reservations can be made)92 may not be
made to treaties which provide for reservations. For treaties which do
not provide specially for reservations, reservations incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty are not permitted.93 One may
generally presume that reservations not falling into any of the above
categories are permissible.94
1. The Object and Purpose Test
The Vienna Convention heralds the first full-fledged appearance of the
object and purpose doctrine in established international law on reserva-
tions, which heretofore had been dominated by the unanimous con-
sent rule. As illustrated in the discussion of the object and purposes
test in connection with the Genocide Convention Opinion,95 im-
puting a purpose to every treaty describes' a new ideal of the
multilateral treaty as a legislative document embodying the general
will of the community of nations. Now 'reservations are deemed to
have an essential nature apart from the collective whims of the reacting
parties. The unanimity rule is relegated to a specific minority of cases.
Curiously, having thus stated the object and purpose test, this test
is not significantly explained or reinforced elsewhere in the articles on
reservations. As a result, commentators differ as to th~ requirements
of validity under the Vienna Convention doctrine and the relationship
of the permissibility and opposability provisions. For purposes of the
following discussion, the two leading schools shall be labelled the per-
missibility school and the opposability school.
The permissibility school ::rgues that, in a treaty that does not pro-
vide for reservations, a reservation incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty is immediately ,and incurably invalid. No accep-
tance by any or all states can validate an impermissible reservation.
In fact, one commentator feels compelled to conclude that states may
not even accept an impermissible reservation:
The contradiction in the conduct of a Party which accepts a treaty
and then "accepts" a reservation which it acknowledges to be con-
92. Ruda emphasizes that the addition of the word "only" changed one of the flexible system's
presumptions. Under the flexible system, it was assumed that treaties which allowed cerrain reserva-
tions prohibired all others. Under the Vienna Convention. only treaties which stated explicitly that
reservations not specified were prohibired had that effect. Ruda. supra nore 20, ar 181.
93. Vienna Convention. supra nore 38. an. 19(c). reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 679. 687
(1969).
94. It/. an. 19. reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 679. 686-87 (1969).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
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trary to the object and purpose of that same treaty is self-evident.
Thus, the conclusion ought to be that impermissible reservations
cannot be accepted.96
The permissibility school thus considers permissibility to be the
primary and dominant aspect of the analysis of validity.
The opposability school, on the other hand, considers opposability
the predominant criterion: .
In the last analysis, under this system, the validity of the reserva-
tion depends solely on the acceptance of the reservation by
another contracting state. It is, of course, to be presumed that
a state has no interest in accepting a reservation which conflicts
with the object and purpose of the treaty, but such considerations
may of course be displaced, for example, in favour of political
motivations; there is nothing to prevent a state accepting a reser-
vation, even if such reservation is intrinsically contrary to the ob-
ject and purpose of the treaty, if it sees fit to do SO.97
The opposability school therefore concludes that the permissibility
criterion has "no practical juridical imponance."98 It may serve as a
guide or rationalization for a state objecting to a reservation, but
fulfills no more concrete purpose.
The confusion arises because the Vienna Convention provides no
mechanism by which the object and purpose of the treaty can be
determined. While the Genocide Convention Opinion and the Inter-
national law Commission specified that the panies should have regard
to the object and purpose, the Vienna Convention treats the object
and purpose of a treaty as an unaffiliated metaphysical concept. Since
the Vienna Convention does not specify who is to determine the object
and purpose of the treaty and the compatibility of the reservation with
that object and purpose, two interpretations have arisen. The per-
missibility school suggests that an international court would be well
suited to adjudicate a dispute about an allegedly impermissible
reservation.99 The opposability school, like the International law Com-
mission in the 1960s, prefers to leave it to the parties. 100
This doctrinal dispute holds tremendous jurisprudential implications
for the law of multilateral treaties in general. If the opposability
school's interpretations were to prevail, the view of treaties implied by
the Vienna Convention would remain overwhelmingly subjective. The
96. Bowell, supriZ note 2, at 83.
97. Ruda, supriZ note 20, at 190.
98. Id.
99. Bowen, supriZ nOle 2, at 70.
100. Ruda, supr/J nOle 20, at 190.
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sovereign rights of states would, in most cases, prevail over the vision
of the treaty as quasi-legislation for an integrated world community.
The validity provisions would then closely resemble the flexible system
with its symbolically significant but practically unimportant purposive
elements. But if the permissibility school's interpretation prevails,101
the purposive view of reservations will fIrmly plant the seed of the pur-
posive, quasi-legislative multilateral treaty ideal into established inter-
national law. The bold repudiation of the absolute sovereignty of
states by.the International Court in its Genocide Convention Opinion
would be given concrete effect.
Even if the permissibility school's view is a minority position, it il-
lustrates that a new sort of argument about reservations, and thus
about treaties in general, has been overtly accepted in international
discourse. The International Court introduced this line of reasoning
but in a limited context. The Vienna Convention made the object and
purpose test at least an element in the majority- of treaties and, if the
permissibility school's test is accepted, a threshold requirement for a
reservation's validity. The decisive shift towards purposiveness has been
made and all subsequent discourse on reservations will have to wrestle
with its jurisprudential consequences. -
2. The Eclectic Structure of Opposability
The inclusion of the object and purpose test in the codification of trea-
ty law- is the first salient innovation of the Vienna Convention doc-
trine. The eclectic structure of the rules concerning opposability is the
second.102 Article 20103 incorporates all three of the logical alternatives of
101. The opposability school's interpr:tation of the Vienna Convention resetvation anicles may
be the most stable. See infra Appendix at pp. 115·16.
102. The analysis in the text makes the consetvative assumption that the opposability school's con-
ception of the relationship between pennissibility and opposability prevails. This does not reptesent
an endorsement of the opposability school's view. Rather it will be shown that the Vienna Conven-
tion doctrine on resetvations holds sranling implications in irs structure of opposability. irs provisions
on effects. and its provisions on consent even if the consetvative view of the opposability school
is adopred. This stanling quality is only intensified if the permissibility school's more progressive
approach is adopted.
103. Article 20 states:
Acceptance of and objection to reservations
1. A resetvation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any subsequent acceptance
by the other conrracting States unless the treaty so provides.
2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the object and
purpose of the treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the panies
is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty. a resetvation
requires acceptance by all the panies.
3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and unless it
otherwise provides. a resetvation requires the' acceptance of the competent organ of that
organization.
4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the treaty otherwise
provides:
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necessary acceptance. In treaties which have a limited number of
signatories and whose object and purpose require that the "application
of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condi-
tion of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty,"I04 the
reservation must receive unanimous acceptance. In a treaty which is a
constituent insttument of an international organization (unless it
otherwise provides), the reservation must be accepted by the organiza-
tion's competent organ, or in other words, reasons the opposability
school, by majority vote. 105 In all other treaties which do not provide
specifically for reservations, acceptance by one state suffices to con-
stitute the reserving state a party to the treaty.
The treaty described in article 20(2) closely resembles the plurilateral
treaty of the flexible system which also required unanimous consent
to its reservations. Like the plurilateral treaty, the article 20(2) treaty
by its numerical restriction seems to disqualify itself from being a
legislative document for the international community. As such, it
reaches- back to old contractual notions of legitimization and demands
unanimous consent for its reservations. But ironically, the article 20(2)
treaty clause also presents an ideal opportunity for creating a treaty
which could begin to transcend state sovereignty;l06 the potential com-
munity orientation of this type of treaty is signalled by the only other
appearance of the object and purpose test in the Vienna Convention
articles on reservations. Article 20(2) presents in microcosm the head-
on confrontation between subjective and purposive reasoning about
reservations and exposes a clash of visions of multilateral treaties.
The second type of treaty not specially providing for reservations
mentioned in article 20 is a treaty that is a constituent instrument of
an international organization. In the Vienna Convention, only the
(a) acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation constitutes the reserving Slate
a party to the treaty in relation to that other State if or when the treaty is in force for rhose
States;
(b) an objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not preclude the entry
into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless a contrary intention
is definitely expressed by the objecting State;
(c) an act expressing a State's consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a reserva·
tion is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has accepted the reservation.
5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 and unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reserva·
tion is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the
reservation by the end of a period of rwelve months after it was notified of the reservation
or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.
Vienna Convention, supra note 38. art. 20, reprinted in 8 Im'L LEGAL MATS. 679. 688 (1969).
104. Vienna Convention. supra note 38. art. 20(2). reprinted in 8 INTL LEGAL MATS. 679. 688
(1969).
105. Ruda, supra note 20, at 187.
106. Ruda suggests that this treary clause is most frequently used in treaties concerning regional
economic integration and cooperation, which may be seen as signalling the beginning of community
norms overcoming absolute state independence. [do at 186.
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competent organ has to accept a reservation for it to become valid.
Assuming that most international organizations have roles that reduce
that consent to a majority vote, article 20(3) introduces the "collegiate
system" 107 of reservations. Several states had suggested the collegiate
system as the appropriate compromise mechanism for resolving a con-
troversy as to the validity of a reservation.108
But again, a compromise appearance belies a revolutionary essence.
In addition to this restriction placed on the argumentation used by
the parties, the collegiate provision of article 20(3) is the first provision
on reservations that imposed an offensive reservation on non-
consenting states. Even in the Pan-American and flexible systems, an
opposing state did not have to have any relations with a reserving
state. Under article 20(3), an opposing state can conceivably be forced
not only to have treaty relations with the reserving state, but also to
give effect to a reservation which it has rejected outright. It is notable
and no coincidence that this most severe intrusion on state sovereignty
occurred in just those treaties which most resemble in formation and
substance a type of embryonic legislation for an international
community.
Article 20(4) describes opposability roles for-the third category, i.e.,
all other treaties that do not provide specially for reservations. Subsec-
tions (a) and (c) incorporate the Pan-American role into the Vienna
Convention strocmre. By so doing, the Vienna Convention system may
inherit the second anomaly of the Genocide Convention Opinion,109
since the Pan-American role when combined with the purposive ele-
ment of article 19 increases the probability that some states may con-
sent to a reservation on the grounds that it is compatible with the trea-
ty's object and purpose, while other states may oppose the reservation
on the ground that it is incompatible. More generally, the explicit
assumption that a treaty has an object and purpose confronts the
possibility that two parties to the treaty may actively disagree as to the
nature of the treaty's object and purpose.
3. The Provision on Effects
The remaining provisions of article 20 introduce the third and fourth
innovations of the Vienna Convention system: the provision on legal
effects and the codification of tacit consent. As to legal effects, subsec-
tion (b) provides that "an objection by another contracting State to
107. In a collegiate system, the panies collectively determine the validity of the teservation, often
by vote. Bowett, supra note 2, at 81-82.
108. Ruda, supra note 20, at 190. A collegiate system is especially atttactive whete it is imponant
for the panies to decide once and for all whether the reservation is compatible with the objecr and
purpose of the treaty. See JIIpra text accompanying notes 66-72.
109. Ruda, supra note 20, at 190.
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a reservation does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as
between the objecting and reserving States unless a contrary intention
is definitely expressed by the objecting·State."no Article 21,111 which
deals with legal effects of objections to reservations, provides in its first
paragraph that an accepted reservation modifies the relations between
the reserving and accepting states, and in its second paragraph, pro-
vides that the reservation "does not modify the provisions of the treaty
for the other parties to the treaty inter se." Finally, article 21 provides
in its third paragraph that when an objecting state has not opposed
the entry into force of the treaty as between itself and the reserving
state, "the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as
between the tVlO States to the extent of the reservation. If
Here the Vienna Convention seems to be overtly seeking to preserve
as much of the treaty as possible even when parties disagree about a
reservation. Unlike the League system whose provision on effects cut
out of the treaty altogether any reserving state whose reservation is op-
posed, and unlike the Pan-American system which dissolved all rela-
tions under the treaty between every reserving and opposing state, the
Vienna Convention tries to salvage as much as is uncontroversial about
the relations between reserving and opposing states. Although this at-
tempt seems sensible and even laudable, it threatens to obliterate the
difference between an accepted and an opposed reservation, and
renders objection to the reservation a fruitless endeavor. 1I2
110. Vienna Convention, suprl1 note 38. an. 20(4)(b), reprinled in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 679,
687 (1969).
111. Article 21 states:
Legl1l efficis of resert/l1lions I1nd of objections 10 resert/l1lions
1. A reservation established with regard to another party in accotdance with articles 19, 20
and 23:
(a) modifies for the reserving State in irs relations with that other party the provisions
of the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation; and
(b) modifies those provisions to the same extent for that other party in its relations with
the reserving State.
2. The reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other panies to the
treaty inler se.
3. When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entty into force of the treaty
between irself and the reserving State. the provisions to which the reservation relates do not
apply as between the two States to the exrent of the reservation.
Vienna Convention. suprl1 nore 38, an. 21. repnnled in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 679. 688 (1909).
112. For instance, in the ease of a reservation in which a state declares that one clause of the
treaty will simply not apply to it. the acceptance of the reservation would effectively delete that
clause from the treaty as regards the relarions between the reserving and opposing states. An objee·
tion to the reservation. pursuanr to article 21(3). would do the same vis·a-vis the opposing Slate.
Therefore, in the case of such a reservation. an opposing state is faced with only two real alternatives:
accept the reservation or object and oppose the entty into force of the treaty. The intermediate path
the Vienna Convention tries to provide is an illusion.
Ruda goes so far as to claim that even an opposing state considering a reservation modifying but
excluding the application of a clause faces the same diminished range of choices:
A texwal interpretation of [the] phrase ["to the extent of the reservation"] leads to the result,
contrary to the explanations given. that the clause to ",hich the reservation relates may be ap-
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While generalizations are difficult, it seems clear that in a large
number of cases this new feature of the Vienna Convention eliminates
the practical difference between an accepted and an opposed reserva-
tion. In its zeal to smooth the path of the reserving state, the Vienna
Convention seemed inadvenendy to lay a trap for the unwary oppos-
ing state. The Vienna Convention doctrine thus succeeds in enhancing
the reserving state's autonomy, but at the price of limiting an oppos-
ing state's ability to exercise its sovereign will.
4. Tacit Consent and the Formulation of Consent
Paragraphs 1 and 5 of Anicle 20 provide the Vienna Convention's
standards for implied consent. Under paragraph 1, a state is deemed
to have consented to any reservation expressly authorized by the treaty.
Paragraph 5 states: .
[Flor the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 and unless the treaty
othetwise provides, a reservation is considered to have been ac-
cepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reser-
vation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was
notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed
its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later. 113
These provisions incorporate some of the flexible sy.>tem's elaborate
provisions on express and implied consent into the established law of
treaties. 114 Again, these provisions, though seeming merely to clarify the
notion of consent, operate as subtle restraints on the power of states
to oppose offending reservations at will.
Article 23 lays down formal requirements for the making of Ieserva-
tions, expanding upon the flexible system's effons. ll5 The formaliza-
plied to a cellain extent, "to the extent of the reselVation." whatever this may be, even when
there is an objection. In the case of a reservation the intention of which is not to exclude
but to modify the application of a clause, this clause should. therefore. be applied between
the objecting and the reserving state "to the extent of the reservation." This textual interpreta-
tion of the Convention leads us to think that ultimately the legal effects of an objection and
an acceptance of a reservation are identical. when the treary remains in force between the object·
ing and reserving state.
Ruda. supra note 20, at .200.
113. Vienna Convention, supra note 38, art. 20(5), reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 679. 688
(1969).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
115. Allicle 23 States:
Procedure regarding reservations
1. A reservation, an express acceptance of a reservation and an objection to a reservation
must be formulated in writing and communicated to the contracting States and other States
entitled to become parties to the treary.
2. If formulated when signing the treary subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, a
reservation must be formally confirmed by the reserving State when expressing its consent to
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tion of consent also marks a shift away from the pure subjective will
of the parties, as discussed above. 1l6 By standardizing intent and
categorizing consent, the law of reservations has already begun to
make the form rather than the substance of will the focus of attention.
Again, subtle restraints further invade the pure power of opposing
states to exercise their sovereign will.
5. Conceptual and Practical Implications of the
Vienna Convention Doctrine
\"{Thile the Vienna Convention leaves the current state of the law of
reservations unsettled, certain conceptual and practical implications of
the Vienna Convention doctrine can be seen in the analysis of the sub-
jective and purposive elements of the doctrine as it presently stands.
First, the Vienna Convention codifies a conceptual change in the
view of multilateral treaties which the Genocide Convention Opinion
and the flexible system had tentatively formulated. The Vienna Con-
vention creates functional categories of multilateral treaties and thus
represents the first formal acknowledgment in the law of reservations
of the widely varying roles that multilateral treaties can play in inter-
national relations. 117
Second, the Vienna Convention's failure to clarify the relationship
of its purposive and subjective elements means that the decision on
the balance between the elements can only emerge from current prac-
tice. If a dispute between the interpretations arises in current practice,
as is likely to occur, the dispute will probably be settled either by
resort to the International Court of justice or by a clarification of the
Vienna Convention by its parties. If the International Court resolves
the dispute, it will be important to note whether it uses a contractual
be bound by the treaty. In such a case the remvation shall be considered as having been made
on the date of ;tS confirmation.
3. An express acceptance of. or an objection to. a reservation made previously to confirma·
tion of the reservation does not itself require confirmation.
4. The withdrawal of a reservation or of an objection to a reservation must be formulated
in writing.
Vienna Convention. supra note 38, art. 23. reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 679. 688·89 (196!».
Article 22. not considered here. lays OUt the formal requirementS for withdrawal.
116. See supra text accompanying note 81.
117. For instance, article 20(3) describes a treaty resembling a legislative document both in
substance and in form of enactment. Article 20(2) appears 10 describe the earlier League.style lleaty
which depends on unanimous consent and not normative values for its legitimacy. However. article
20(2) incorporates a clash of visions by its very terms. See supra text accompanying note 106. Article
20(4) seems to take a Pan-American/flexible system approach. implying a view of the multilateral
treaty as the sum of its bilateral pans. In fact. the visions of treaties that these provisions actually
describe will depend in large part on whether the permissibility school's or the opposability school's
interpretation of the relative importance of the object and purpose test prevails. See supra text ac·
companying notes 97-108.
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analysis (looking primarily to the subjective wills of the parties to the
Vienna Convention) or whether it instead uses a statutory interpreta-
tion based on its conception of the object and purpose of the Vienna
(;onvention. The International Coun's choice will indicate the impor-
tance it attaches to the purposive element in the modern doctrine of
reservations. llS
By the same token, if the parties to the Vienna Convention under-
take to clarify the convention in order to resolve the interpretive
dispute, it is likely that they will decide the matter by redrafting and
voting. The terms of the voting would be quite revealing. If a strict
majority vote is required to resolve the question, one would be able
to discern a legislative attitude toward the convention. If, on the other
hand, a near unanimous vote is required, the emphasis on state
sovereignty and the contractual attitude wo.uld be clear.
Finally, if no such dispute brings the interpretive problem to light,
this is likely to be because states employ the -flexible standards and
allow other states to accept impermissible reservations. The absence of
a dispute, then, would suggest that the more subjective approach and
vision of the opposability school prevails.
In shon, the Vienna Convention doctrine -fails to answer the old
questions and contradictions raised by its predecessor doctrines and
raises a number of new problems. Only a conscious and realistic ap-
praisal of the clash of visions behind these problems can lead to their
fruitful resolution.
III. CONCLUSIONS
With the aid of the graph developed in the Appendix, the conclusions
reached intuitively in Part 1I can be described more precisely. The
League and the Pan-American systems represent by far the most sub-
jective of all the positions and are quite stable, but depend for their
stability on their capacity to maintain the .integrity of the bilateral
components of their multilateral treaties. The Genocide Convention
Opinion, with its disparity between purposive rhetoric and Pan-
American-style deference to state sovereignty, falls far shon of equi-
librium and stability. All three categories of treaties under the Interna-
tional Law Commission's flexible system make the quantum leap
towards purposiveness, but without making the concomitant sacrifice
of state sovereignty necessary to remain internally consistent. The op-
118. The object and purpose test as presented in the Vienna Convention reservation articles seems
to apply equally to all three types of treaties described in articles 20(2)-(4). No suggestion is made
to the contrary. and the object and purpose requirement in article 19(c) is cast in very general terms
for treaties that do not provide for reservations. Thus the International CoUrt's evaluarion of the
object and purpose test in the Vienna context will signal irs position on the importance of the pur-
posive element in multilateral treaties.
HeinOnline -- 23 Harv. Int’l. L. J.  106 1982-1983
106 HarvardInternationalLawJournal/Vol. 23
posability school's interpretations of the Vienna Convention articles
20(2) and 20(4) treaties are generally more stable than those of the
permissibility school, because the permissibility school incongruously
pairs a pre-eminent object and purpose requirement with the League
and Pan-American systems of enforcement, respectively. The shared in-
terpretation of the article 20(3) provision is stable because the visions
implied therein require a high degree of political integration which is
matched by the extent of rational constraint.
This historical and conceptual analysis of the doctrine of reservations
suggests three conclusions beyond the realm of reservations and treaty
law. First, the key to understanding and perfecting legal doctrines lies
in larger visions of political relations and legal order. On a practical
level, the application of a legal doctrine is aided by an understanding
of the legal and political visions which "structure and animate" the
doctrine itself. 119 A legal doctrine, which is found to be clearly un-
workable, as the Genocide Convention Opinion doctrine would have
been in practice, may well be repaired when its conceptual assump-
tions are examined and realigned.
Second, as analytic tools, legal doctrines probe the very heart of cen-
tral political and legal debates of our time. One might reverse the
order of analysis suggested by the graph in the Appendix, and analyze
the evolution of legal doctrines over time, as seen in Part II, in order
to discover the vertical component of political visions and the horizon-
tal component of legal vision which the doctrines reveal. 120
Finally, once the visions are revealed, the choices and challenges
which they pose must be responsibly and earnestly pondered. For if
even the relatively minor doctrine of reservations reflects a fundamen-
tally ambivalent image of international society, then the great debate
of state sovereignty versus world community truly pervades every aspect
of international law. And if international law is to be refined and e>t-
119. Parker. supra note 4, at 79-80.
120. For instance. this analysis of the five velSions of the doctrine of reservations prompts some
observations about the legal and political agendas of the twentieth century. FilSt. the telative stability
and subjectivity of the League of Nations position on teservations suggests that legal thinkelS in that
period felt comfortable with traditional legal and political notions of state sovereignty, despite their
rheroric about world community.
Second, the relative instability of the doctrines appearing after 1950 seems to reflect a fundamental
indecision about the structure of the post·Worid War II world. The categorization of treaties with
distinct rules for each category allowed the Vienna Convention framers to include traditional notions
of state sovereignty. i.e.. by incorporating the League and Pan·American enforcement systems in
the Vienna Convention doctrine on reservations, while at the same time encouraging political arid
lesal integration in the article 20(3) doctrine.
Finally. the legal draftelS involved in these post·war efforts seemed to envision quite putposive
legal instirutions but their efforts to activate those institutions were hobbled by their abiding in·
stincts valuing state autonomy. In a similar way. the United Nations Security Council projects the
image of international legal unity. but the veto power of the post·War Big Five limits the Council's
effectiveness on pressing issues.
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panded so that it effectively provides order and rational constraint in
the world, one must begin with a precise and realistic picture of the
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The dual influences of the political and legal dynamics on the evolu-
tion of the doctrine of reservations may be portrayed on a graph, as
illustrated supra at p. 108.
The origin, being the intersection of the political and legal axes,
represents the notion of state sovereignty in its most extreme form.
Absolute state sovereignty in. the political sense connotes complete
political independence of states in international society. Absolute state
sovereignty in its legal sense connotes the raw will of the state, un-
constrained by any international legal order or obligations. The in-
tersection of the two axes at this shared point of absolute state
sovereignty represents a point in legal and political theory with no
ordering and no social relations.
The two axes represent, horizontally, the spectrum from the pure
subjective to the pure purposive views of legal relations among states
and, vertically, the spectrum from the pure subjective to the pure pur-
posive views of political relations among states.121 The horizontal coor-
dinate of any given position represents the· extent of rational· const~aint
on state sovereignty and thus represents the permissibility aspect of
that position. The vertical coordinate of any given position represents
the political constraint on state sovereignty, i.e., the extent to which
state power becomes dependent upon the power of other states, and
thus represents the opposability aspect of that position.
The horizontal axis represents a legal spectrUm that spans the two
divergent legal visions of treaties which in turn reflect two visions of
world order. At the origin, one vision depicts no legal relations among
states, no intrusions into the absolute sovereignty of states and thus
complete legal independence of states. At the opposite end, another
vision depicts a multilateral treaty which is so broad in scope and
uniform in application that it in fact creates an integrated world legal
system. 122
Moving from left to right along the horizontal axis, legal relation-
121. At the subjective ends of the axes, both political and legal relations are chosen: states choose
to ally themselves with some states and not others, they also choose to sign treaties with some States
and not others. At the purposive end, both political and legal relations are dictated by standards
external to individual state discretion: the demands of a world community and a world legal order.
In pure theory, legal relations and political relations would more or less mirror each other. Legal
relations would become a formal codification of political relations. They oughr to refleer each other
because a legal doctrine describing a predominantly purposive legal component (such as the primary
imponance of the objecr and purpose test) and an extremely subjective political component (such
as a requirement of only acceptance by one state to validate a reservation) is contradictory in d=rib-
ing at once both substantial and minimal constraints on state sovereignry. Yer ir is nor difficulr
to imagine actual cases in which the patterns of political and l~gal relations between states diverge
widely. As is revealed graphically, a. legal doctrine may indeed embody such contradictions.
122. The section of the legal spectrum representing a.bsolute state sovereignry is the subjective
end; the world legal system represents the purposive end.
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ships among states occur more often and become increasingly defined.
On the left half of the axis, where the subjective vision dominates,
treaty relations are detetmined by the subjective will of the parties;
thus the treaties are essentially reciprocal contractual relationships
among the parties. 123
Treaties plotted at the midpoint of the horizontal axis are presumed
to contain a minimal but distinguishable object and purpose. This
midpoint corresponds .to the intuitively defined multilateral treaty that
differs from the raw conglomeration of bilateral relations. The minimal
object and purpose provides that element of collective commitment
that gives the concept of the multilateral treaty a separate essence. 124
The multilateral whole, which now includes an extra ingredient of
common aim, becomes more than just the sum of its bilateral parts.
Moving to the pure purposive end of the axis, the object and pur-
pose of the treaty becomes more and more assertive in its demands
on state sovereignty and embraces more and more of the treaty's
substance. At the extreme, such a "treaty" would be, in effect, a world
constitution. All elements of the treaty would serve the ob.ject and
purpose of world government. m
The importance of the permissibility criterion increases as one moves
from left to right along the horizontal axis, because the rational con-
straint upon the reserving party's ability to reserve effectively increases
until, at the end of the axis, no reservations are allowed. 126
The vertical, political axis spans the two divergent political visions
of die world. As already noted, the vision at the graph's origin depicts
a world of completely autonomous, independent states. The vision at
the othc;r end of the axis depicts a fully integrated world community
in which states no longer exist as separate entities. 127
Moving up along the political axis, there is a steady progression
123. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 55·56 and accompanying text.
Such treaties ale dominantly a fotm of what Fuller call; organization by reciprocity. epitomized in
his example of a potato falmer and an onion falmer trading excess ClOpS. A reciprocal multilateral
treaty is merely the aggregate of the bilateral relations which the treaty creates; nothing of substance
relates the bilateral relations to each other. Each set of bilateral relations. however. achieves its
exchange.based ends as a reciprocal bilateral treaty would. Reciprocity requires that "the panicipants
must want diffetent things;" the only "general grounds" on which it may be defended arc that "it's
good for me and it's good for him." See Fuller. supra note 17. at 358. 367.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
125. The bilateral and multilateral treaties on the right half of the axis are dominantly a form
of what Fuller calls "organization by common aims," illustrated by the example of twO men who
contraetto cooperate in moving a boulder blocking a common access road. This type of organization
requires that panicipants want the same thing or things; and the "general grounds" on which allY
patticulal actions may be defended are rational arguments relating the action to the common aims.
Fuller, supra note 17. at 366.
126. See supra note 15.
127. The absolute sovereignty end is the subjective end of the political spectrum; the world com·
munity vision appear.; at the purposive end.
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towards greater and greater interaction among states, until, at the mid-
point of the political axis, multilateral relations among states possess
,a minimal but distinguishable element of group identity, i.e., these
.states view themselves as a group with common interests. Along the
upper half of the .axis, state~ become increasingly interdependent,
forming ever more cohesive international organizations, until at the
top, they have formed a world community.
The opposability element, or the degree to which the relations of
the reserving state are dependent upon the actions of the reacting
states, corresponds to this political axis. Opposability increases as
restraints on the reserving state's sovereign will increase, until at the
top of the axis, community needs eliminate the reserving states ability
to reserve at all. 128
The line which bisects the axes (the line X= y), at which the degrees
of the political and legal integration are equal, carries normative im-
portance. Simply put, this line represents those positions at ~hich the
political constraints on state sovereignty equal the legal constraints on
state sovereignty. 129
Even along the x=y line, one may distinguish between'doctrines on
reservations which reflect multilateral treaties with a distinct essence
and an ingredient of common aim, and those doctrines which reflect
multilateral treaties that are nothing more than the sum of their
bilateral parts. The doctrines reflecting collections of bilateral treaties
appear on the line where the horizontal and venical values are below
the midpoint values; the doctrines reflecting the new distinctive
multilateral treaties, i.e., those treaties having a broader common pur-
pose such that they are more than merely an aggregation of bilateral
treaty relationships, appear at the midpoint values and above.
A legal doctrine is likely to be unstable in both internal logic and
application unless it evolves to a form in which the legal and political
demands on state sovereignty are roughly equal. 130 The line x =y is
therefore descriptive of the equilibrium which all views of reservations
must approach. 13l
128. See supra nOle 15.
129. This is of course true in an algebraic sense; its conceptual validity can be shown by consider-
ing the factors used to determine the coordinates. The political coordinate of the position on reserva·
tions increases as the reserving state's dependence upon the teacting states increases. The legal coor-
dinate increases as the degree of rational constraint on the reserving state's ability to reserve incr~es.
If a legal docrrine embodies incongruous political and legal restraints on state sovereignty. tension
will encourage change in the doctrine until the cwo sets of restraints become more equal.
130. Only on that line does the doctrine prescribe the same degree of constraint on state
sovereignty in both political and legal relations. And thus it is only on or near that line that legal
doctrine can balance the demands which pure law and pute politics place upon it. When legal doc-
trine strays far from that line. legal and political visions clearly divetge, ptescribing conflicting views
of state sovereignty.
131. The line x=y seems also to be associated with the concept of legitimacy. See supra note
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It is now possible to plot the historical versions of the doctrine of
reservations as points on the graph. Although absolute numerical
values mean nothing in this exercise, the relative locations of the dif-
ferent versions can be determined by comparing their x and y values
with each other.
A. The League System
The legal coordinate of the league system approaches the midpoint
of the horizontal axis because it guarantees some uniformity of
bilateral commitments through the unanimous consent
requirement. 132 It falls short of the midpoint of the axis because the treaty
does not necessarily contain an object and purpose. 1H
The political coordinate approaches the midpoint of the vertical axis
because the unanimous consent requirement makes pairs of bilateral
relations dependent upon each other. That is, no reservation can come
into effect between any two panies until it has been accepted by all
the other parties. The political coordinate falls short of the midpoint
because there is no guarantee the parties acknowledge any group iden-
tity or common interest; in fact, the unanimous consent requirement
acts as a son of veto by any party and thus safeguards each party's
sovereign will against the group will with regard to reservations.
The league system approaches but falls short of elJuilibrium because
it does not guarantee that a perfect matching of demands on state
sovereignty will occur between the political and legal values; it
demands unanimous consent for reservations, thus creating relatively
high political interdependence but otherwise does not guarantee that
the treaty will represent much more than the sum of its bilateral
parts. 134 Nevertheless, it falls close to the line of equilibrium and thus
represents a nearly stable doctrine.
B. The Pan-American System
The Pan-American system has a horizontal value less than the League
10. On this line. the quality of detachment (represented by the legal coordinate) is perfectly balanc·
ed with the qualities of sensitivity and criticism (represented by the political coordinale).
The association of this line with the concepr of legitimacy is suggesled further by the example
of the Genocide Convention Opinion docttine. As seen below. his doctrine falls far from lhe x c y
line. The subsequent history of the doctrine of reservations supportS the suggestion lhal the
Genocide Convention Opinion doctrine is not legitimate. that is. not possessing the quality which
inspires voluntary acceptance. Neither the InternatiC!nal La., Commission nor the Vienna Convention
adopted the docuine or reasoning of the International CoUrt in their later codification of thr' law
of resenations.
132. See supra note 40 and texr accompanying notes 26·29.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 41·43.
134. See supra rext accompanying notes 40·41.
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system because it places less rational constraint upon state
sovereignty-it does not provide for treaty provisions on reservations
and guarantees no shared element in the treaty commitments of all
parties.m The Pan-American system has a vertical value which is less than
that of the League system because each pair of bilateral relations is
independent of the others, in that the acceptance of a reservation by
one reacting party will not bind another reacting party, and the objec-
tion to a reservation by one reacting party will not prevent the reserva-
tion from going into effect between the reserving state and a consent-
ing party.
The Pan-American system thus lies on the line of equilibrium, but
only because it reduces every multilateral treaty to its bilateral com-
ponents. It successfully balances a legal vision of bilateral legal order-
ing and a political vision of independent bilateral relations, each of
which hinges on the integrity of bilateral involvements. The Pan-
American system, however, fails to give the multilateral treaty any in-
dependent usefulness as an alternative to the bilateral treaty as a form
of legal ordering.
C. The Genocide Convention Opinion
The Genocide Convention Opinion system has a horizontal value
larger than the midpoint value because it describes only normative
"civilizing" conventions which demand that reservations must be com-
patible with the object and purpose of the treaty. But because the
system of enforcement prescribed by the Court is similar to that of
the Pan-American system,136 its vertical coordinate corresponds to the
point describing pairs of bilateral relations.
The Court depicted in its reservation doctrine a normative,
legislative treaty in a world of continuing intense state sovereignty. As
the graph suggests, the substantial gap between its political and legal
constraints on state sovereignty inspired the two anomalies described
above137 and made the Genocide Convention Opinion doctrine one of the
most unstable of all the twentieth-century reservation doctrines. The
subsequent history of the doctrine supports this conclusion. 138 Most of
the later versions of the doctrine de-emphasized the object and pur-
pose test or prescribed a larger degree of state interdependence and,
as shown below, thus resulted in more stable legal doctrines.
135. See supra note 40.
136. See suprtr text accompanying notes 63-65.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
138. See supra note 131.
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D. The International Law Commission's Flexible System
The flexible system described three separate sets of reservation re-
quirements, which are graphed separately. 139 The horizontal coordinate
of the bilateral treaty is the midpoint value, because an object and
purpose is said to exist but reservations were not explicitly required
to be compatible with that object and purpose to be admissible. 140
The vertical coordinate of the ILC bilateral treaty doctrine is the
relatively low value assigned to bilateral relations.
The ILC bilateral treaty doctrine is far from stable because it restricts
bilateral treatymaking to treaties which have an object and purpose.
It thus denies the existence of purely reciprocal bilateral treaties. 141
The ILC's plurilateral treaty doctrine has a horizontal value equal
to the midpoint value, because it presumes the existence of an object
and purpose but does not demand that reservations be compatible
with that object and purpose. Its venical value is the same as the
League system's, because of the demand for unanimous consent of the
parties. The doctrine appears to be unstable. It requires unanimous
consent to validate the reservation, thus 'reflecting a cenain faithfulness
to political state sovereignty, but it also assens, without further ex-
planation, that the object and purpose of the treaty must play a
significant role in the validation as well.
The ILC "multilateral" treaty doctrine has a horizontal coordinate
larger than the midpoint value because it is, by definition, a nor-
mative document. 142 The horizontal coordinate is not equal to that of the
Genocide Convention Opinion, however, because there is no require-
ment that reservations be compatible with the object and purpose of
the treaty. Its venical value is equal to the Pan-American vertical
value, however, because the opposability requirements allow an oppos-
ing state by its objection to affect only its own bilateral relations with
the reserving state. Thus the relations among pairs of states are
relatively independent.
The ILC "multilateral" treaty doctrine lies relatively far from the line
of equilibrium. It presupposes an object and purpose and a normative
essence but the extreme state political sovereignty inherent in the Pan-
American provisions on opposability and effects incorporated by the
flexible system can easily destroy any treaty's ability to serve that object
and purpose.
139. For the sake of clarity. the ILC provisions on plurilateral and multilateral treaties which are
the constituent insttuments of international organizations are not graphed. The relative position of
doctrines including this type of treaty is represented by the Vienna Convention ankle 20(3) treaty
doctrine.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
141. See supra notes 123 & 125 and accompanying text.
142. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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E. The Vienna Convention Doctrine
The Vienna Convention also describes three sets of requirements for
reservations. Two of these three sets have two representations, depend-
ing upon whether the permissibility school's or the opposability
school's interpretation 6f the articles is used.
1. Article 20(4) Treaty Doctrine
The vertical coordinate of both versions of the article 20(4) treaty doc-
trine is equal to the Pan-American version's vertical value, since accep-
tance by only one state is required to establish a reservation and the
reservation goes into effect against each state which accepts it. 143 The
horizontal coordinate of the opposability school's version of the article
20(4) doctrine is at the midpoint value because the object and purpose
of the treaty is assumed, but given minimal importance since there
is no requirement that reservations be compatible with that object and
purpose.
The permissibility school's version of the article 20(4) treaty doctrine
has the same horizontal coordinate as the Genocide Convention Opin-
ion doctrine, since reservations must be generally compatible with that
object and purpose. 144
The permissibility school's version of article 20(4) treaty doctrine is
less stable than the opposability school's version because of the large
rational constraint represented by the dominant object and purpose re-
quirement matched with the subjective Pan-American system of
enforcement.
2. Article 20(2) Treaty Doctrine
The opposability school's version of the article 20(2) treaty doctrine is
located at the same point as the ILC plurilateral treaty doctrine
because of their identical coupling of League requirements on the
political axis and minimal object and purpose requirements on the
legal axis. The permissibility school's position has the same vertical
coordinate as its article 20(4) value; the horizontal coordinate is at the
point at which all treaty provisions are required to be compatible with
the treaty's object and purpose. Again the opposability school's posi-
tion is more stable than the permissibility school's version. The con-
siderable purposive element of rational constraint is incongruously
143. Anicle 20(4) and anicle 21 together describe a Pan-American kind of system of opposability
and effects. See supra notes 103 & ill and text accompanying note 109.
144. See supra text accompanying note 94. The compatibility requitement. however. is not ab-
solute. because the treaty may provide for specifically prohibited or permitred reservations. or pro·
hibit reservations altogether.
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coupled with the unanimous consent requirement, which allows states
to safeguard their sovereign will by vetoing repugnant reservations. 14~
3. Article 20(3) Treaty Doctrine
Finally, the permissibility school and opposability school's version of
the article 20(3) treaty doctrine falls at the same point because the ob·
ject and purpose of the treaty is to be the constituent instrument of
an international organization. The article 20(3) treaty doctrine has a
large horizontal component because it is a constituent instrument of
an international organization and thus has considerable normative,
legislative influence. Because the existence of an international
organization itself represents considerable interdependence among
states, the vertical coordinate is also high. The article 20(3) treaty doc-
trine is on the line of equilibrium because it joins parties who have
formed an international organization with a treaty constituting the
constituent instrument of that organization. it is stable and the most
purposive of all views on reservations. It matches a large degree of
state interdependence on the political aXis with a large degree of legal
organization and rational constraint on the- legal axis.
145. Note that both article 20(2) positions ate telatively unstable. This conclusion is verified in
the intuitive analysis of the anicle 20(2) treaty doctrine above. See supra tcxt accompanying notes
105-6.
